Augustine's Framing
of the Predestination Debate
Gregory Johnson
(Notes and Bibliography follow)
Framing
a Divisive Issue
For nearly two thousand years of
church history, few issues have caused as much division within Christ's body as
the question of predestination. Though
nearly every church has felt compelled to hold to some doctrine of election,
these interpretations of the biblical material have differed greatly. Gottschalk in the ninth century was
condemned, tortured, imprisoned and denied a Christian burial for falling on
the wrong (or right) side of this debate.
The Greek Orthodox were divided over election in the seventeenth
century, first affirming an Augustinian doctrine of predestination, only to
reverse that decision a few decades later in council. And the first Protestants were divided over the question of
predestination from men like Erasmus, who refused to break with Rome. Today, the doctrine of predestination
divides evangelical Protestantism into two camps, the Calvinist and the
Arminian. And even within the Reformed
or Calvinistic camp, the question has been framed in various ways,
supralapsarians differing from infralapsarians, who themselves differ from
sublapsarians.
For some modern Augustinians, the
doctrine of election is an outgrowth of theology proper, a necessary corollary
to the sovereignty of God. The emphasis
with this approach falls on an eternal decree from all eternity determining two
vehicles through which God's glory should be displayed, the elect and the
reprobate, the fall being decreed as a means toward this end. Thus the question is framed in light of
eternity.[1] For others,
the question is framed in light of God's providential outworking in history,
God working all things together for the good of His elect, so as to provide the
instrumentality necessary to induce faith.
Here the question is framed in light of divine providence.[2] But Augustine
takes neither of these approaches. The
question of predestination is not primarily one of divine sovereignty and human
responsibility. Rather, Augustine frames the question of
predestination in light of the believers experience of grace in light of man's
fall. When Augustine considers
the effects of Adam's sin upon his posterity, the Christian's experience of
grace becomes the integrating point for Augustine's doctrine of election. Within Augustine's affectional theology,
predestination explains the believer's change in affections, the grace to love
God being given to one and not to another.
Augustine
& Free Will
Though the fact may surprise some
who frame the debate in terms of divine sovereignty, it must be stated that
Augustine is not an enemy of the free will.
In fact, Augustine is vehement in his defense of free will on
occasion. In one of his earliest
writings, On Free Will, Augustine
argues for human free will over against the Manichees among whom he had once
been numbered. And as his debates with
the Pelagians over election flared up later in life, Augustine was equally
forceful in asserting both the freedom of the will and the resulting human
responsibility. It was for this reason
that Augustine wrote On Grace and Free
Will only one year before his primary work on election, On the Predestination of the Saints. Every man has the ability to choose that
which he desires; every man has free will.
Augustine was accused by some of
changing his position on free will from his earlier work, but Augustine claimed
that no change in his thinking took place.
Pelagius himself at times quoted from Augustine's On Free Will as an authority to defend his views. By proof-texting Augustine's affirmation of
the free will in this earlier writing, the Pelagians argued that Augustine had
originally held to a doctrine of the will's moral ability to believe apart from
grace, as did they themselves.
Augustine rejects this argument.
In his Retractiones, Augustine
insists that his earlier work On Free
Will was simply not concerned with predestination, but with anthropology
over against the Manichees.[3] For Augustine,
the two debates can be distinct, for, unlike Pelagius, Augustine does not see
election as a debate about God's sovereignty or man's natural freedom to
choose. The will is not the center of the debate as Augustine frames it; the
necessity of God's grace within the individual's experience is central.[4]
Damaged
Affections and Lost Liberty
While affirming the
"freedom" of the will (as a part of anthropology as defined in On Free Will) over against the
Manichees, over against the Pelagians, Augustine asserts that fallen man does
not enjoy the "liberty" held by Adam. Augustine's distinction approximates the distinction in later
Reformed thought between the natural
ability to choose and the moral ability
to choose in a godly manner.
"Fallen man has free choices, always of evil, but he does not enjoy
freedom."[5] Due to Adam's
rebellion, all humanity is born dead in its sin, without even the liberty to
choose not to sin. Man is incapable of
obedience precisely because man does not desire to be obedient. Humanity's problem, Augustine explains, lies
not primarily with the will per se, but with the affections. Augustine himself prays:
What
was not evil in my deeds or, if not in my deeds, in my words or, if not in my
words, in my intention?... Your right
hand had regard to the depth of my dead condition, and from the bottom of my
heart had drawn out a trough of corruption.
The nub of the problem was to reject my will and to desire yours. But where through so many years was my
freedom of the will?[6]
Thus the problem lies, not primarily
with the will, but with the affections, the desires. Man's free will, though ever present, stands impudent before the
power of corrupt affections. Evil
people produce evil desires, from which their free wills make evil decisions. Again, Augustine writes:
We,
however, on our side affirm that the human will is so divinely aided in the
pursuit of righteousness, that (in addition to man's being created with a free
will, and in addition to the teaching by which he is instructed how he ought to
live) he receives the Holy Ghost, by whom there is formed in his mind a delight
in, and a love of, that supreme and unchangeable good which is God.[7]
The
Spirit of God must change the affections, turning the mind from a delight in
lesser things to a delight in God Himself, man's chief end, the unchangeable
good.
This affectional emphasis runs
throughout Augustine's treatment of election.
M Cleary suggests, "Delight and love become key factors in
Augustine's understanding of the working of grace... affectivity becomes the
key factor in the theology of salvation."[8] Peter Brown
writes about the role of affections in Augustine's theology:
Throughout
his sermons against the Pelagians, Augustine repeats this as his fundamental assertion
on the relation of grace and freedom:
that the healthy man is one in whom knowledge and feeling have become
united; and that only such a man is capable of allowing himself to be
"drawn" by the sheer irresistible pleasure of the object of his love.[9]
Faith
is God's Gift
As man's affections must change
before he can ever freely choose to believe, Augustine argues that even the
very beginning of faith must be accredited to God-- and to God alone. It is the Father, through the Spirit, who
teaches men to follow Christ, "and He does not do this through the ear of
the flesh, but of the heart."[10] To this
teaching John Rist questions, "whether in the case of the 'elect' grace is
irresistible and the individual has no choice but to be 'free' to act justly?"[11] Though the
term "irresistible" would receive much use in later centuries, the
word itself can be dangerously misleading; for Augustine, again, does not frame
the question as one of God sovereignly acting against a helpless human will
incapable of resistance. The will, per
se, is not even the primary object of God's grace; rather, it is the heart
which is the object of God's enlightening.
Nevertheless, Augustine answers the
question of whether this grace can be resisted in no uncertain terms. "This grace, therefore, which is
hiddenly bestowed in human hearts by the Divine gift, is rejected by no hard
heart, because it is given for the sake of first taking away the hardness of
heart.... [God] thus makes them children and vessels of mercy which He has prepared
for glory."[12] Augustine
rhetorically asks, "If God does not make men willing who were not willing,
on what principle does the Church pray, according to the Lord's command, for
her persecutors?"[13] Thus, without
any external coercion, God gives to His elect the desire to follow Christ, the
desire to believe, the affection for God greater than other affections. It is the fallen sinner's need to be freed
from misdirected affections which requires a God who can effect such a change.
The
Gift's Basis
And Augustine argues that this gift
of grace is not given in any sense on the basis of human merit. He repeatedly comes back to Paul's words in
1 Corinthians 4:7. The refrain echoes,
"For what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received it, why boastest thou as if thou hast
not received it?"[14] Faith itself,
rooted in the affection for God, is itself a gift from God-- not a gift merely offered to the human will, but a gift
actually given to the human
heart. John Rist again asks whether
this grace is offered irresistibly.[15] Rist does
affirm that man cannot be saved without the help of God,[16] but Augustine insists that God's grace is not merely
offered to man, to be accepted or rejected at will, but that God supernaturally
changes men's desires. Such action goes
beyond divine assistance; all is of grace.
The
Experiential Context
One could imagine that Augustine
asked himself why one man believed and another man did not. Why did Augustine believe and not his
neighbor? Was Augustine simply more
intelligent than his neighbor? If so,
who gave that intelligence? But for
Augustine, the question was not one of intelligence. Was Augustine more righteous than his neighbor? How could that be, if both sinned in Adam,
both receiving guilt and depravity through Adam's seed? Even if grace had been offered to them both,
both being dead in sins, why would one accept it and the other reject it? What Augustine understood was that the
ultimate difference between the believing sinner and the unbelieving sinner lay
not in man, but in the hand of God, changing the affections of the one and
leaving the other in his sin. One is
inwardly taught by God to obey the gospel; the other is not-- here is
Augustine's distinction between the outward (universal) and the inward
(effectual) call of the gospel. He
writes:
When,
therefore, the gospel is preached, some believe, some believe not; but they who
believe at the voice of the preacher from without, hear of the Father from
within, and learn; while they who do not believe, hear outwardly, but inwardly
do not hear and learn-- that is to say, to the former it is given to believe;
to the latter it is not given. Because
"no man," says [Jesus] , cometh to me, except the Father which sent
me draw him."[17]
Hence,
salvation is wrought in the elect strictly by the gracious hand of God, who
gives even the faith itself to one and not to another.
Indeed, Augustine could have viewed
himself in the above quotation.
Augustine himself faced the difficulty of being unable to believe. "Give me chastity, but not yet."[18] Augustine
drank deeply of Manichaeism, was sexually immoral, carried along from one new
teaching to another. It was his own
experience of grace that caused him to think about how such conversion could
happen. He prays:
Your
words struck fast in my heart and on all sides I was defended by You. Of Your eternal life I was certain, though I
saw it 'in an enigma and as if in a mirror.'... I was attracted to the way, the
Saviour Himself, but was still reluctant to go along its narrow paths. And You put into my heart, and it seemed
right in my heart, that I should visit Simplicianus.[19]
From
the very beginning, it was God's initiative which brought Augustine to
Christ. Of his own experience, he
writes:
I sighed
after such freedom, but was bound not by an iron imposed by anyone else but by
the iron of my own choice. The enemy
had a grip on my will and so made a chain for me to hold me as a prisoner. The consequence of a distorted will is
passion. By servitude to passion, habit
is formed, and habit to which there is no resistance becomes necessity. By these links, as it were, connected one to
another (hence my term a chain), a harsh bondage held me under restraint.[20]
Augustine
goes on to describe how he heard a young girl saying "Pick up and read,
pick up and read," which after thought he considered a divine
command. Taking up Romans 13:13-14,
Augustine believed. All the changes
that followed, Augustine explains, were "the effect of Your converting me
to Yourself."[21] Thus God
brought Augustine to faith in Christ.
M. Cleary, criticizing the simplicity of the Pelagian view of human
action, observes, "Personal experience had taught Augustine that the human
situation was far more complicated than [the Pelagians were teaching]."[22]
Double
Predestination the Only Answer
If all those who are saved are saved
by grace alone, and if all those on whom this grace is shed come to faith, then
the question the Christian faces is this:
Why are all not saved? Augustine
is not unclear in his answer here; God has not chosen to save everyone. All are not objects of God's saving
grace. "For if every one who has
heard from the Father, and has learned, comes, certainly every one who does not
come has not heard from the Father; for if he had heard and learned, he would
come."[23]
Thus a double predestination is in
view-- Augustine has two categories, those chosen for grace and those not
chosen for grace. This is not a double
predestination in which God works, to use Luther's words, "fresh
evil" into the hearts of the reprobate.
This is a double predestination in which God works positively for the
good in the hearts of the elect, passively leaving the reprobate in their sins. Nevertheless, this is a double
predestination. Jaroslav Pelikan
states:
Human
history was the arena for this demonstration [of God's wrath and power], in
which the 'two societies of men' were predestined, the one to reign eternally
with God and the other to undergo eternal suffering with the devil.... Double
predestination applied not only to the city of God and the city of the earth,
but also to individuals. Some to
eternal life, others to eternal death.[24]
Augustine speaks of unbelievers
having been "predestined to death" and "predestined to
punishment."[25] Augustine
writes:
These
are the great works of the Lord, sought out according to all His pleasure, and
so wisely sought out, that when the intelligent creation, both Angelic and
human, sinned, doing not His will but their own, He used the very will of the
creature which was working in opposition to the Creator's will as an instrument
for carrying out His will, the supremely Good thus turning to good account even
what is evil, to the condemnation of those whom in His justice He has
predestined to punishment, and for the salvation of those whom in His mercy He
has predestined to grace.[26]
Here Augustine distinguishes two
wills of God, namely His moral law and His eternal purpose of predestination,
arguing that even human disobedience is used to disclose His predestination,
both of some (contemplated before the foundation of the earth as fallen) to
punishment and of others to grace. For
Augustine, only a double predestination could explain the believer's experience
of affectional grace in light of the fall, but at the same time, Augustine
would not have conceived of God compelling man to sin in order to bring to pass
an eternal decree of reprobation.
Though this double predestination is
clearly presented throughout Augustine's writings, Augustine most often defines
predestination itself in the positive sense.
That is, when Augustine speaks of predestination, he usually has in view
election, and not reprobation. This can
be seen in his distinction between predestination and grace. Predestination is not grace, per se, but is
God's determination before the foundation of the world of the grace He would
show to some and not to others in history.
"Between grace and predestination there is only this difference, that
predestination is the preparation for grace, while grace is the donation
itself."[27] The elect
therefore love God because God chose before the foundation of the world to give to them the gifts of baptism,
faith and perseverance, ultimately giving those gifts by His grace alone in
history. The purpose of predestination,
then, is grace.
The
Goal of Predestination
If the purpose of predestination is
grace, then the goal of predestination is belief, righteousness and holiness in
the lives of the elect. God did not
predestine men because they believe, but that they may do so. "Whence it is not for any other reason
that [Jesus] says, 'Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you' [John 15:16],
than because they did not choose Him that He should choose them, but He chose
them that they might choose Him; because mercy preceded them according to
grace, not according to debt."[28]
Similarly, God never predestined a
man because he was (or would become) holy and righteous, but God predestined
him so that he might become holy and righteous. Augustine writes, "Therefore God chose us in Christ before
the foundation of the world, predestinating us to the adoption of children, not
because we were going to be of ourselves holy and immaculate, but He chose and
predestinated us that we might be so."[29] The goal of
predestination is belief, righteousness and holiness in the lives of the elect,
the outworking of true affection for God.
Perseverance
& Assurance
This predestination to faith and
holiness serves to explain the believer's experience of conversion, but it has
implications for the Christian's life as well.
Man was created for God, and finds no rest until found in God. And since the fall, since man is incapable
of delighting in God alone, predestination brings about the grace of changed
affections, resulting in rest in God.
For Augustine, there is no basis for peace and assurance apart from the
predestinating God. Augustine's
application is pastoral, to direct our eyes forever outward to God for grace,
rather than inward upon ourselves, or even upon our own faith. Augustine writes, "And, therefore,
commending that grace which is not given according to any merits, but is the
cause of all good merits, [Paul] says, 'Not that we are sufficient to think
anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God.' ... So no one is
sufficient for himself, either to begin or to perfect faith; but our
sufficiency is of God."[30]
Augustine marvels that any man would
rather rely on his own efforts at pleasing God than on God's promise to Abraham
that He Himself would provide for the faith and good works of the nations. "I marvel that men would rather entrust
themselves to their own weakness, than to the strength of God's promise."[31] Further,
Augustine makes clear what he sees as the end of such moralism, "to fall
under that condemnation which is, not poetically, but prophetically, declared,
"Cursed is every man that hath hope in man."[32] A trust in
human works, and perhaps even a trust in faith as a human work, is antithetical
to trust in the Lord of all grace.[33]
It must be wondered whether or not
Augustine enjoyed the kind of assurance which would be enjoyed by Protestants
in another thousand years. Augustine
clearly speaks of salvation as a present reality for the Christian, a salvation
grounded in our faith, but more fundamentally in God's grace which makes the
Christian believe. And like faith,
though perseverance is required of the Christian, it is yet a gift-- a
perseverance which flows from the preserving grace of God. Augustine argues:
As,
therefore, although it is the gift of God to mortify the deeds of the flesh,
yet it is required of us, and life is set before us as a reward; so also faith
is the gift of God, although when it is said, 'If thou believest, thou shalt be
saved,' faith is required of us, and salvation is proposed to us as a
reward. For these things are both
commanded us, and are shown to be God's gifts, in order that we may understand
both that we do them, and that God makes us to do them.[34]
Perseverance, like faith itself, is a gift given by grace alone to
God's elect. Again, Augustine explains:
Now a
man is made a good tree when he receives the grace of God. For it is not by himself that he makes
himself good instead of evil; but it is of Him, and through Him, and in Him who
is always good. And in order that he
may not only be a good tree, but also bear good fruit, it is necessary for him
to be assisted by the self-same grace, without which he can do nothing
good. For God Himself co-operates in
the production of fruit in good trees, when He both externally waters and tends
them by the agency of His servants, and internally by Himself also gives the
increase.[35]
Thus God preserves the elect through both internal and external
means. Not only the beginning, but also
the continuance, of the Christian life is empowered by God and His grace. The Christian experience, Augustine insists,
has begun by grace and continues by this same grace.
Non-Predestined
Believers
Still, Augustine does qualify his
doctrine of predestination with regard to perseverance. He holds out the possibility that some may
come to faith, but not be predestined to persevere. All Christians may not go to heaven-- a predicament Calvin would
not face within his system. So long as
one remains in this life, the possibility remains that the regenerate believer
might commit apostasy, failing to add to his faith love. Such are those not predestined to
persevere. In On Rebuke and Grace, Augustine writes:
For
who of the multitude of believers can presume, so long as he is living in the
mortal state, that he is in the number of the predestinated? Because it is necessary that in this
condition that should be kept hidden; since here we have to beware so much of
pride, that even so great an apostle was buffeted by a messenger of Satan, lest
he should be lifted up.[36]
The Christian, Augustine argues, can
never be completely certain that he is numbered among the elect. Luther's sentiments were not altogether
opposed to Augustine here, either, even going so far as to instruct believers
on the proper method of perseverance while in the pains of death, lest they
fall away at the last moment and be damned.
But for Augustine particularly, the doctrine of predestination could not
always be used to assure believers.
There must always remain the fear of apostasy. Predestination explains the believer's believing, but it does not
necessarily insure a continued belief, until death when one can be sure of his
election.
The
Root of Augustine's Problem with Perseverance
Mark Vanderschaaf blames Augustine's
failure here on his infralapsarianism, arguing that, since in Augustine's
system God's decree to elect logically follows the decree to permit the fall,
that election can in no way be of assurance to believers.[37] Vanderschaaf
does not substantiate his assertion that infralapsarianism is at fault,
however. Nor does he demonstrate how
such a lack of assurance necessarily follows from an infralapsarian position.
It seems more likely
that Augustine's hesitancy to provide the believer with stronger assurance
flows more from his assumption of baptismal regeneration[38] or from his largely unformed doctrine of
justification than from his infralapsarianism.[39] For if all
those baptized, including infants, are truly and objectively regenerate,
cleansed of original sin and forgiven of all past sins, then the fact of
apostasy itself requires that believers have the ability to fall fully and
finally into damnation. Once baptism's
efficacy was limited by the Protestant Reformers so as to not necessarily
include regeneration, then the possibility arose that the baptized apostate
were never truly regenerate,[40] a mainstay of the later Reformed argument.
And it should be noted that
Augustine does not deny that predestination can provide any assurance to the believer, simply that the believer cannot be
completely certain of his election.
Augustine reassures his readers, "If God works our faith, acting in
a wonderful manner in our hearts so that we believe, is there any reason to
fear that He cannot do the whole?"[41] The believer
looking outward to Christ, forever reliant upon God's preserving grace, there
is no need for fear, for God will work the whole of salvation. Vanderschaaf is overstating his case when he
writes that "Augustine offers no assurance of salvation."[42] Augustine
would argue that some assurance is possible, just that certainty about
perseverance is not-- we are always dependent upon grace to preserve us as we
"work out our salvation in fear and trembling." Still, one does wish that Augustine had gone
further in providing assurance to true believers.
Not
a Wholly Improper Attitude
But let it be said that Augustine's
hesitancy to provide assurance is not a wholly improper attitude. Augustine's fear is that the believer will
rely on His own faith, looking inward upon his own believing for assurance,
rather looking outward to Christ. By
looking inward, he warns, pride can overcome the believer. For Augustine, perseverance is a dynamic
rather than a static reality;[43] the Christian must add to his faith also love. Referencing James, Augustine rejects any
faith that is not accompanied by good works.[44] The Christian
must be kept by the power of God, always looking to Christ in His grace rather
than to his own works of baptism and faith.
This is a useful corrective, albeit and over-corrective, to today's
common teaching that all who have professed Christ should have 100% assurance
100% of the time. The Christian's
assurance should be only as strong as his reliance upon Christ for grace.
And within this dynamic
understanding of perseverance, Augustine saw the discipline of God as a good
thing for believers.[45] All
Christians will at times be forsaken by God, Augustine asserts, but, like those
Paul "handed over to Satan to be taught not to blaspheme," this forsakenness
is for the Christian's good, to prevent pride and to remedy the hardness of
heart. Augustine explains, "God in
some degree forsakes you, in consequence of which you grow proud, that you may
know that you are 'not your own,' but are His, and learn not to be proud."[46] Thus God uses
even our sin, as offensive to Him as it may be, to work in His children hearts
reliant upon God. Even forsakenness
trains the believer's affections to be always and only placed upon God.
Learning
from Augustine: Teaching Election to
those with Experiences
Despite the problems concerning the
believer's perseverance, Reformed teachers still have much to learn from
Augustine's framing of the question of predestination. More often than not, the twentieth century
Christian finds the doctrine of election abhorrent. But why does it seem so abhorrent? The cry is heard again and again: "Because God has given men free will!" The Christian begins his theological
reflection from his own experience, particularly his experience of
conversion. And every Christian knows
that it was he who had to
believe. Every Christian realizes he
has a will. When Reformed teachers
begin by simply affirming a divine determinism, the Christian thinks his
experience is being denied. Augustine's
genius, however, was to use the doctrine of election, not to deny the
Christian's experience, but to explain the Christian's experience.
The predestination debate today
falls upon ears trained to think of it in terms of the opposition of divine
sovereignty and human free will.
Calvinists, many think, are those who reject free will, which most Arminians
without a theological education perceive in anthropological rather than moral
terms-- an affirmation in which the Calvinist can concur. Perhaps because the Reformed position is
viewed as a denial of the human will, arguments from theology proper about the
eternal decree simply do not resonate with most believers today. It seems to deny their experience. To present eternity as the point from which
election is pondered is to remove it from its real applicability to the
individual Christian's experience. The
Christian's starting point is his own experience of God's changing his own
heart within history. If this is where
the Christian is starting, then perhaps this is where the Christian's teachers
should start as well.
Augustine formulated of the doctrine
of predestination in order to properly explain the believer's experience of
grace. Once the fact of an historical
fall was taken into account, with all its implications for the individual's
affections, no other doctrine could be found to provide explanation but the one
at which Augustine arrived. Was the
doctrine objectively stated in the Scriptures?
Of course, but again, Augustine's genius was to present it as an
explanation of the believer's experience.
Thus, for Augustine, to deny election was not merely to have a skewed
doctrine in one's list of beliefs; to deny election was to explain one's
experience in meritorious terms. To
deny election was to rely ultimately upon oneself for salvation. As Warfield puts it, "Augustine was
most of all disturbed that God's grace was denied and opposed."[47]
Augustine's believer-oriented
approach, finding its starting point within the experience of conversion in light
of the fall, is an approach that resonates well with Christians, for it
conforms to their own experience.
Seeing such conformity, but perhaps disliking the systematic
implications of salvation by grace alone, the believer is then driven to the
Scriptures to see if it is indeed biblical.
Thus the believer's experience serves as the context for teaching
predestination. For every Christian can
understand experientially that it is God alone who has saved him; the teacher's
goal is to present the biblical teaching that best explains such experience.
NOTES
[1]This approach is characteristic of supralapsarianism, and is true of WCF 3.1, though the Confession is not consistent in its supralapsarianism, at other times approaching infralapsarianism. It should be noted that, while the moderator of the Westminster Assembly was supralapsarian, the majority of the Assembly was infralapsarian.
2Millard Erickson takes this approach in his Christian Theology, which enables him to deny the necessity of prior regenerating grace while at the same time remaining Calvinistic.
3See, for example, Augustine's review of On Free Will, Retractiones I.ix in John H. S. Burleigh, ed. Augustine: Earlier Writings (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), 103.
4Though I need to study more on this point, it would seem that supralapsarians and Pelagians are alike in framing the question of predestination in terms of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, each falling on a different side of the coin.
5John Rist. "Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," in R.A. Markus, ed. Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), 223.
6Augustine. Confessions, IX.i. Henry Chadwick, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
7Augustine. On the Spirit and the Letter, V, in Whitney J. Oats, ed. Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, Vol. 1. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1948).
8M. Cleary. "Augustine, Affectivity and Transforming Grace." Theology XCIII No. 753, May-June 1990. p208.
9Peter Brown. Augustine of Hippo. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), 374.
10Augustine. On the Predestination of the Saints, XIII, in Oats.
11Rist, 229.
12Predestination, XIII.
13Predestination, XV.
14Predestination, VII.
15See, for example, Rist, 228, 229, 234, 237.
16Rist, 222, 232.
17Predestination, XV.
18Confessions, VIII.17.
19Confessions, VIII.1.
20Confessions, VIII.10.
21Confessions, VIII.29.
22M. Cleary, 207.
23Predestination, XIII.
24Jaroslav Pelikan. The Christian Tradition Vol. 1: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600). (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971) 297.
25See De Anima et eius Origine.
26Augustine. The Enchiridion, C, in Oats.
27Predestination, XIX.
28Predestination, XXXIV.
29Predestination, XXXVII.
30Predestination, V.
31Predestination, XXI.
32Predestination, II.
33This accusation need not necessarily apply to modern evangelical Arminians, as, like Wesley, they often hold to a gracious ability to believe counteracting the effects of the fall, flowing preveniently and universally to men. Though exegetically untenable, this provides the systematic qualification that assures salvation by grace alone. Still, at the lay level, I have often found this understanding missing among the Arminians by whom I was first nurtured in Christ.
34Predestination, XXII.
35Augustine. On the Grace of Christ, XX, in Oats.
36Quoted in Mark E. Vanderschaaf, "Predestination and the Certainty of Salvation in Augustine and Calvin." Reformed Review 30:1, Autumn 1976, 5.
37Vanderschaaf, 1-3.
38See, for example, The Enchiridion, LII.
39The parallel with Luther, who did have a clear doctrine of forensic justification, would seem to make the former taching, baptismal regeneration, more likely to blame.
401 John 2:19.
41Predestination, VI.
42Vanderschaaf, 5.
43Augustine would not be pleased with the language of "eternal security."
44The Enchiridion, LXVII.
45Those believers who are damned are those who do not return to the faith before their death. Death, therefore, becomes for Augustine a blessing when it comes to one in faith. For at death, the possibility of apostasy ceases, and the believer is made unable to sin.
46Augustine. On Nature and Grace, XXIX, in Oats.
47B.B. Warfield. "Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy," in The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield Vol. IV: Studies in Tertullian and Augustine (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1930), 293.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Augustine. Confessions. Henry Chadwick, trans. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1991).
Augustine. The
Enchiridion, in Whitney J. Oats, ed. Basic
Writings of Saint Augustine, Vol. 1. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House,
1948).
Augustine. On Free Will, in John H. S. Burleigh, ed. Augustine: Earlier Writings
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953).
Augustine. On
Nature and Grace, in Whitney J. Oats, ed. Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, Vol. 1. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Book House, 1948).
Augustine. On the
Grace of Christ, in Whitney J. Oats, ed. Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, Vol. 1. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Book House, 1948).
Augustine. On the
Predestination of the Saints, in Whitney J. Oats, ed. Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, Vol. 1. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Book House, 1948).
Augustine. On the
Spirit and the Letter, in Whitney J. Oats, ed. Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, Vol. 1. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Book House, 1948).
Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo. (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1967).
Cleary, M.
"Augustine, Affectivity and Transforming Grace." Theology XCIII No. 753,
May-June 1990. 205-212.
Pelikan, Jaroslav. The Christian Tradition Vol. 1: The Emergence
of the Catholic Tradition (100-600).
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).
Rist, John. "Augustine on
Free Will and Predestination," in R.A. Markus, ed. Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972).
Schaff, Philip. History of the Christian Church, Vol
III: Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1910).
Vanderschaaf, Mark E. "Predestination and the Certainty of
Salvation in Augustine and Calvin."
Reformed Review 30:1, Autumn
1976, 1-8.
Warfield, Benjamin
B. "Augustine and the Pelagian
Controversy," in The Works of
Benjamin B. Warfield Vol. IV: Studies
in Tertullian and Augustine (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1930),
289-412.
[1]This approach is characteristic of supralapsarianism,
and is true of WCF 3.1, though the Confession is not consistent in its
supralapsarianism, at other times approaching infralapsarianism. It should be noted that, while the moderator
of the Westminster Assembly was supralapsarian, the majority of the Assembly
was infralapsarian.
[2]Millard Erickson takes this approach in his Christian Theology, which enables him to
deny the necessity of prior regenerating grace while at the same time remaining
Calvinistic.
[3]See, for example, Augustine's review of On Free Will, Retractiones I.ix in John H. S. Burleigh, ed. Augustine: Earlier Writings
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), 103.
[4]Though I need to study more on this point, it would
seem that supralapsarians and Pelagians are alike in framing the question of
predestination in terms of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, each
falling on a different side of the coin.
[5]John Rist.
"Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," in R.A. Markus,
ed. Augustine: A Collection of Critical
Essays. (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday & Company, 1972),
223.
[6]Augustine. Confessions, IX.i. Henry Chadwick, trans. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1991).
[7]Augustine. On the Spirit and the Letter, V, in
Whitney J. Oats, ed. Basic Writings of
Saint Augustine, Vol. 1. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1948).
[8]M. Cleary. "Augustine, Affectivity and
Transforming Grace." Theology XCIII No. 753, May-June 1990.
p208.
[9]Peter Brown.
Augustine of Hippo. (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1967), 374.
[10]Augustine. On the Predestination of the Saints, XIII,
in Oats.
[11]Rist, 229.
[12]Predestination, XIII.
[13]Predestination, XV.
[14]Predestination, VII.
[15]See, for example, Rist, 228, 229, 234, 237.
[16]Rist, 222, 232.
[17]Predestination, XV.
[18]Confessions, VIII.17.
[19]Confessions, VIII.1.
[20]Confessions, VIII.10.
[21]Confessions, VIII.29.
[22]M. Cleary, 207.
[23]Predestination, XIII.
[24]Jaroslav Pelikan. The Christian Tradition Vol. 1: The Emergence
of the Catholic Tradition (100-600).
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971) 297.
[25]See De Anima et
eius Origine.
[26]Augustine. The Enchiridion,
C, in Oats.
[27]Predestination, XIX.
[28]Predestination, XXXIV.
[29]Predestination, XXXVII.
[30]Predestination, V.
[31]Predestination, XXI.
[32]Predestination, II.
[33]This accusation need not necessarily apply to modern
evangelical Arminians, as, like Wesley, they often hold to a gracious ability
to believe counteracting the effects of the fall, flowing preveniently and
universally to men. Though exegetically
untenable, this provides the systematic qualification that assures salvation by
grace alone. Still, at the lay level, I
have often found this understanding missing among the Arminians by whom I was
first nurtured in Christ.
[34]Predestination, XXII.
[35]Augustine. On the Grace of Christ, XX, in Oats.
[36]Quoted in Mark E. Vanderschaaf, "Predestination
and the Certainty of Salvation in Augustine and Calvin." Reformed
Review 30:1, Autumn 1976, 5.
[37]Vanderschaaf, 1-3.
[38]See, for example, The
Enchiridion, LII.
[39]The parallel with Luther, who did have a clear
doctrine of forensic justification, would seem to make the former taching,
baptismal regeneration, more likely to blame.
[40]1 John 2:19.
[41]Predestination, VI.
[42]Vanderschaaf, 5.
[43]Augustine would not be pleased with the language of
"eternal security."
[44]The
Enchiridion, LXVII.
[45]Those believers who are damned are those who do not
return to the faith before their death.
Death, therefore, becomes for Augustine a blessing when it comes to one
in faith. For at death, the possibility
of apostasy ceases, and the believer is made unable to sin.
[46]Augustine. On Nature and Grace, XXIX, in Oats.
[47]B.B. Warfield. "Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy," in The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield Vol. IV: Studies in Tertullian and Augustine (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1930), 293.